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TORTS-OBSTRUCTION OF A CIVIL ACTION-COERCION BY A MEDICAL A1'r
SOCIATION To PRECLUDE AVAILABILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN A MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ACTION - Plaintiff approached nine physicians in an attempt to secure an expert witness for a medical malpractice action.1 All
nine refused, allegedly as a result of threats by the county medical association to expel them and cause a cancellation of their malpractice
liability insurance if they testified. The association's actions stemmed
from a finding by its "malpractice committee" that the malpractice defendant had not been negligent. Plaintiff then brought this action against
the association to recover compensatory and punitive damages for obstruction of a civil action.2 On appeal from an order granting a motion for nonsuit, held, affirmed. No cause of action can arise from inducing one to assert his legal rights.s Agnew v. Parks, (Cal. App. 1959) 343 P. (2d) 118.

1 The plaintiff's f~t malpractice trial ended in a nonsuit, reversed on appeal. Agnew
v. City of Los Angeles, 82 Cal. App. (2d) 616, 186 P. (2d) 450 (1947). The second resulted
in a judgment for the defendant, reversed on appeal. Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 97 Cal.
App. (2d) 557, 218 P. (2d) 66 (1950). The third trial, pending when the instant action
was brought, resulted in a $37,883.91 judgment, affirmed on appeal, 134 Cal. App. (2d)
433, 286 P. (2d) 566 (1955).
2 A second cause of action was directed against the medical association and a Dr. Parks,
for conspiracy to defraud.
8 A second basis for the decision was a holding that the action was partially barred by
the statute of limitations.
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The expert testimony of a local physician is necessary to make out
a prima fade case in virtually every malpractice action.4 It has been asserted that an awareness of this fact on the part of medical groups has in
some instances resulted in the use of a "conspiracy of silence"5 as a
means of stemming the surging tide of malpractice litigation.a The principal case embodies the first direct action by a malpractice claimant
against a medical association for damages as a result of its enforcement
of such a "conspiracy." It is clear, as the court held, that an individual
physician has no duty to testify upon the mere request of a claimant. A
contrary result would mean that a claimant could indirectly compel expert testimony, a power which the law has placed within the discretion
of the court.7 But the court's further conclusion, that simply because a
physician has no duty to testify the actions of a third party8 forcing him
not to testify are therefore necessarily lawful, seems unsound. While the
actions of the medical association do not precisely fit into any nominate
tort category, they do appear to fall within principles derived from closely analogous cases. Where one party is in need of services which in the
normal course of events would be available to him, a third party whose
negligent intervention is the sole reason why such services are not forthcoming has been held liable to the potential beneficiary for resulting
damages, notwithstanding the fact that the potential source of such services was under no legal duty to render them.9 The principal case presents
4See 2 HARPER AND JAMF.S, TORTS §17.1, pp. 968, 969 (1956). Some moves have been
made toward liberalizing the means whereby a plaintiff can get his case to the jury without expert testimony, such as a broadened doctrine of res ipsa loquitur [e.g., Ybarra v.
Spangard, 25 Cal. (2d) 486, 154 P. (2d) 687 (1944) ], an expansion of the field of "common knowledge" where the jury may fix the standard of care [e.g., Malone v. Bianchi,
318 Mass. 179, 61 N.E. (2d) 1 (1945)] and statutes permitting the use of textbooks in lieu
of expert testimony [e.g., Mass Laws Ann. (1949) c. 233, §79c]. However, expert testimony
is still necessary in the vast majority of cases.
5 See Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. (2d) 465 at 484, 234 P. (2d) 34 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
6 For a recent statistical treatment, see Stetler, "The History of Reported Medical
Professional Liability Cases," 30 TEMPLE L.Q. 366 (1957).
7 The court has the inherent power to compel testimony, including expert testimony
[2 WIGI\IORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §563 (1940)], qualified in some jurisdictions by the requirement of a tender of adequate compensation before an expert will be compelled to prepare himself and to render expert opinion testimony. Note, 25 !LL. L. REV. 344 (1930).
In California this power is codified in Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1949) §1871.
s The plaintiff labelled her action as one for conspiracy, but the court held that
since there was no legal wrong, there could be no conspiracy to commit a legal wrong. Cf.
PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 235 (1955). For the relevance of concerted actions in determining
the existence of a legal wrong, see note 15 infra.
9 See PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 188 (1955). In Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Simmons Co.,
167 Wis. 541, 168 N.W. 199 (1918), the defendant negligently ruptured the municipal
water intake pipe, shutting off all water service. Seven days later, plaintiff's house caught
on fire and was lost solely because of the lack of water. The facts that the municipality
was not providing the service to the plaintiff when the defendant acted and that it had
no duty to provide such services were held immaterial, and the defendant was held liable.
See also Gilbert v. New Mexico Constr. Co., 39 N.M. 216, 44 P. (2d) 489 (1935). The same

804

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 58

an even stronger basis for liability since the defendant's intervention was
intentional and since the services lost were admitted by the demurrer to
be otherwise available to the plaintiff.10 Another line of authority would
appear to be even more relevant.11 The acts of a trade1 2 or professional1 3
association in unjustifiably14 coercing its members into a concerted boycott15 of the trade or profession of another has been held actionable. As
one writer states the rule, " . . . it now seems generally agreed . . . that
there are certain types of conduct, such as boycotts, in which the element
of concert adds such a power of coercion . . . that it makes unlawful
acts which one man alone might legitimately do."16 Although these cases
have arisen principally in the area of unfair competition, there seems to
be little in principle to distinguish them from the principal case. On the
one hand, a business is lost; on the other, a cause of action, but in both
an unjustifiable internal group coercion has resulted in concerted action
depriving another of the prospective advantage he was otherwise free to
receive. In being deprived of voluntary ex.pert testimony, the plaintiff
suffered an injury. While it is true that a court could subpoena expert
testimony, although this is not a matter of right,17 a man who is forced
to testify is not likely to be as favorable as one who agrees to do so, especially when the reason he does not appear voluntarily is that his medical association has actively condemned the plaintiff's claim. The medical
profession is seriously and perhaps justifiably concerned about the present
principle has been recognized in California in Hanlon Dry Dock &: S. Co. v. So. Pac. Co., 92
Cal. App. 230, 268 P. 385 (1928), approved in Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Pacific
Gas and Electric Co., 220 Cal. 515, 31 P. (2d) 793 (1934).
10 Even absent such an admission, it would appear that as a rule expert testimony is
available to a malpractice claimant. The large number of malpractice actions before the
courts (see note 6 supra), virtually all involving expert testimony (see note 4 supra),
coupled with the fact that the medical association felt it necessary here to take affirmative
steps to preclude expert testimony from being given, attest to its availability in the normal
course of events.
11 See, generally, PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., §107 (1955) ("Interference with Prospective
Advantage").
12E.g., Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 69 N.E. 1085 (1904).
13 E.g., Pratt v. British Medical Association, [1919] I K.B. 244.
14 The presence or absence of justification in the traditional commercial boycott case,
e.g., Martell v. White, note 12 supra, is usually determined by balancing the injury to the
individual's freedom to carry on his trade against the interest of the association in engaging
in free competition. In the principal case, the interests to be balanced are those of the
association in insulating one of its members from legal liability as opposed to those of the
plaintiff in obtaining the most favorable hearing of her claim that the law will allow, a
balance clearly in the plaintiff's favor.
15 It is by analogy to the commercial boycott cases that the element of concert becomes
relevant. See note 8 supra. As Dean Prosser puts it, " ••. the individual is limited in
the damage he can do by his own capacity for economic pressure or persuasion. A combination has far greater potentialities of coercion, not only of others but also of its own
reluctant members. ••." PROSSER, TORTS, ,2d ed., §107, p. 755 (1955) (emphasis added).
See also Wyman, "The Law as to Boycott," 15 GREEN BAG 208 (1903).
16 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 236 (1955).
17 See note 7 supra.
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state of the law in the medical malpractice area.18 But its efforts to correct the situation should be within the law, perhaps in seeking remedial
legislation. In the principal case, the county medical association, a somewhat less than impartial tribunal, tried the plaintiff's case against one of
its members, found in favor of the member, and then used its unique
position of power over every potential witness to insure that its decision
would not be upset in a court of law. Surely no profession should be able
to stand above the law by being permitted to determine for itself the
professional liability of its members. Such, however, appears to be the
result of the principal case.
William Y. Webb
18 For an extensive popular treatment of the reasons for the medical profession's concern, see Silverman, "Medicine's Legal Nightmare," SAT. EVE. Posr, April 11 (p. 13), April
18 (p. 31) and April 25 (p. 36), 1959.

